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Abstract — In this paper, we present a new (t,n)-threshold 
secret images sharing scheme based on linear memory cellular 
automata (LMCA). While all existing LMCA-based sharing 
scheme are not robust, the proposed one provides full robustness 
property. Precisely, any subset of t participants can collude to 
recover the shared secret, in contrast to existing LMCA-based 
schemes when this is possible only for participants having 
consecutive shares. To achieve robustness, produced shares are 
constructed using subsets of different LMCA’s configurations 
instead of using single ones. The subsets are defined according to 
an assignments matrix that is generated using a specific heuristic. 
The proposed scheme is shown to be robust, and its security is 
experimentally evaluated with respect to the problem of secret 
color image sharing. Obtained results illustrate the secrecy of the 
produced shares, while comparison gives an accurate evaluation 
with respect to existing schemes.  
 
Index Terms — Threshold secret sharing, linear memory 
cellular automata, sharing robustness, assignment matrix. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ecret sharing schemes are cryptographic procedures used 
for sharing a given secret among a set of n different 
participants. Each one receives a different data block named a 
share, and when required, only qualified subset of participants 
can colludes and combines their shares to recover the original 
secret. Particularly, a (t,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme 
allows secret's reconstruction only for subsets of t or more 
different participants, while any subset of (t-1) or less 
participants is unable to recover any useful information about 
the secret. Secret sharing schemes have many applications in 
different areas such as electronic-voting, threshold access 
control, e-auction and anonymous token to name a few.  
Several secret sharing schemes have been proposed during 
the last decades. The first (t,n)-threshold scheme was proposed 
in 1979 by Shamir [1] based on Lagrange polynomial 
interpolation, using the fact that at less t different points are 
necessary to define a (t-1)th degree polynomial. In the same 
year, Blackley [2] proposed another threshold scheme based  
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on plane geometry using the fact that any n nonparallel (n-1)-
dimensional hyperplanes intersect at a specific point, and the 
secret may be encoded as any single coordinate of the point of 
intersection. Each participant is given enough information to 
define a hyperplane, and the secret is recovered by calculating 
the plane's point of intersection and then taking a specified 
coordinate of that intersection. In 1983, Asmuth, Bloom [3] 
and Mignotte [4] proposed independently another threshold 
secret sharing schemes using the Chinese Remainder Theorem 
(CRT): the shares are generated by reducing the secret modulo 
a set of relatively primes integers m1,m2,….mn, when the 
construction can be performed by essentially solving the 
system of t congruence using the CRT.  
All mentioned sharing schemes are unconditionally secure 
and permit to solve the sharing problem in an efficient 
manner. However, their computational complexity for sharing 
and reconstructing secrets is polynomial. When dealing with 
large sized secrets such as digital images or multimedia 
content, these approaches are not suitable, and can difficultly 
be adapted to real-time scenarios.  Recently, a new model of 
threshold secret sharing approach exploits the cellular 
automata paradigm and more precisely the linear memory ones 
(LMCA). The LMCA model provides linear complexity for 
both sharing and reconstruction phases, and leads to best 
runtime performances for large-scaled secrets. The first 
attempt for using LMCA in secret sharing has been proposed 
in [5] by considering the secret as an initial configuration of a 
t-order LMCA, and randomly generate the remaining (t-1) 
configurations. The evolution of the constructed LMCA 
produces n consecutive configurations used to define the n 
different shares distributed among the n participants. Running 
the LMCA backward starting from any set of t consecutive 
shares, permits a perfect reconstruction of the shared secret in 
a linear time with respect to the size of secret. The LMCA 
based sharing approach has been enhanced later in [6] using 
two-dimensional cellular automata to handle images sharing, 
then recently, many other variants have been developed: in 
[7], the authors use steganography to build a lossy sharing 
scheme, when in [8] a discrete logarithm based signature 
verification is combined with LMCAs to provide 
authentication of the different shares. Wu and al proposed in 
[9] another combination of steganography and LMCA to build 
a user-friendly secret sharing scheme but only a lossy secret 
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image can be reconstructed. The same authors proposed an 
authenticated image sharing approach in [10] by combining 
wavelets transforms and LMCAs, but unfortunately, they 
detailed only (3,n) threshold instance of the sharing problem 
and assumed that extension to the (t,n) general case is feasible. 
Even if all LMCA based approaches provide best 
performances with respect to the standard Shamir's sharing 
scheme, they all have a major drawback that make them un-
useful for real applications: not all possible sets of t shares 
permit to recover the secret, but only those having consecutive 
ones. Unfortunately, for any given values of t and n (t ≤ n), the 
number of possible sets of t shares having consecutive 
elements equal to (n-t+1) is very small with respect to the 





For example, when (t=3) and (n=10), we have (𝐶10
3 = 120) 
possible set of t shares, when only (10-3+1=8) from them 
verify the property of consecutive elements. Hence, less than 
(7%) of the possible sets of t participants can recover the 
secret.  Such problem makes the LMCA-based secret sharing 
scheme non-robust, and consequently inappropriate for the use 
in real scenario applications.   
In the present work, we propose a solution to the robustness 
problem of the LMCA-based secret sharing schemes. In 
contrast to existing ones, the proposed LMCA-based (t,n)-
threshold secret sharing scheme allows any subset of t 
participants (let 𝐶𝑛
𝑡  subsets) to reconstruct the secret using a 
specific matrix of configuration's assignment: instead of 
giving each participant a single configuration as a share, a 
specific set of different configurations is assigned to each 
participant. Configurations affected to each participant are 
constructed in a such a way that the union of t different subsets 
of t participants contain always t different consecutive 
configurations, while regrouping t-1 or less subsets do not 
permit to achieve such constraint. The assignment of the 
configurations is performed using a specific assignment matrix 
constructed using a heuristically proposed algorithm, while 
sharing and reconstruction are performed as usual using the 
mechanism of LMCA's evolution. The remaining of this paper 
is organized as follows: in Section 2, basic definitions about 
one dimensional cellular automata, LMCAs and reversibility 
are introduced briefly. In Section 3, the proposed scheme is 
described. Security analysis and proofs of the schemes are 
presented in section 4 with a set of experimental results. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 
II. THEORETICAL PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we briefly present the main definitions of 
one dimensional cellular automata, linear memory cellular 
automata (LMCA) and the main existing LMCA-based secret 
sharing schemes with related definitions and security aspects. 
A. One dimensional cellular automata 
A cellular automata consist of a number of cells arranged in 
a regular lattice, each cell has its own state that can change in 
a discrete time step. States of the whole CA’s cells are updated 
synchronously using a local transition rule that define each 
new cell’s state using its old state, and the states of the 
corresponding neighbors. The neighbors are a specific 
selection of cells relatively chosen with respect to a given 
cell’s position that can be defined for each cell using a radius r 
on the lattice. This will give 2r+1 different neighbor including 
the cell itself. The boundaries cells of the lattice are 
concatenated together in a cyclic form to deal with finite size 
automaton. If the same update rule is used for all the cells then 
the resulting CA is named uniform. Otherwise, if a different 
transition rule is used each time the cell's position change, the 
resulting CA is named non-uniform.  
Formally,  if we define the state of a cell i at the time t with 
sti, , its state on time t+1 will depend only on the states of the 
corresponding neighborhood at the time t, by applying a 
transition rule that define the way states are updated. If the 
neighborhood radius is r, and if only two cell states are defined 
(0 or 1), the length of each transition rule is then 22r+1 bit, and 
the number of possible rules is equal to 22
2𝑟+1
.  The transition 
rule of one dimensional binary CAs is generally coded using 
the integer value of the corresponding binary representation, 
when the different CA’s configurations are represented by 
binary blocks. 
In contrast to elementary cellular automata, reversible 
cellular automata (RCAs) are a specific case in which every 
configuration has only one unique predecessor. Precisely, 
RCAs are constructed in such a manner that state of each cell 
prior to an update is determined uniquely from the updated 
states of all the cells. Several approaches have been defined to 
construct reversible cellular automata rules. The second-order 
cellular automaton method introduced firstly in [10], in which 
the update rule combines states from two previous steps of the 
automata, permits to turn any one-dimensional binary rule into 
a reversible one using the fact that the state of a cell at time t 
depends not only on its neighborhood at time t-1, but also on 
its state at time t-2. This is ensured by combining the ith cell 
state at time t with the state of the same cell in time t-2 using 
the xor operator.  
If the configuration of a given CA at each time step t is 
defined by Ct, then we can build a second-order RCA using 
the following equation: 
                  Ct=F(Ct-1)  Ct-2                (1) 
when the map "F" denotes the global transition function of the 
related basic CA. Such defined RCA can be reversed trivially 
using the following equation:     
                       Ct-2=F(Ct-1)  Ct                (2) 
The RCAs defined according to equations (1) can always be 
reversed reversible even if the basic underlying CA defined by 
F is not. Hence, we can construct as mush RCAs as possible 
existing CAs.  
Instead of using one initial configuration like standard one-
dimensional CA, two initial configurations are used to evolve 
a second-order RCA. After applying m iteration steps on two 
initial configurations C0 and C1 we can obtain two consecutive 
configurations Cm and Cm+1. When running the same RCA 
backward starting from Cm and Cm+1 as initial configurations, 
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we recover the two configurations C0 and C1 after exactly m 
iteration using the same transition rule. Reversion of RCAs is 
raising qualitatively the same behavior of one-order CAs as 
pointed by Wolfram [11].  
B. Reversible Linear memory cellular automata (LMCA) 
An extension of the second order reversible cellular 
automata is defined by m-order reversible cellular automata 
(m-order RCAs). The same principle is applied since m 
consecutive configurations are used to build a new one, and by 
the same manner, m consecutive configurations are used to run 
the automata backward and recover initial states. Particularly, 
a specific case of m-order RCA is the linear memory cellular 
automata (LMCAs) that use specific linear transition rules. 
Let's consider the set of CAs of size n and symmetric 
neighborhoods of radius r, whose local transition function are 
of the following form: 
   𝑠𝑖
(𝑡+1)
= ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑠𝑖+𝑗
(𝑡) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 2)  𝑟𝑗=−𝑟                 (3) 
where 0≤ i ≤n-1 , and j{0,1}. These are called linear 
cellular automata (LCAs). As there are 2r+1 cells in the 
symmetric neighborhood of radius r, then there exist 22r+1 
different LCAs which goes from 0 to 22r+1-1, and each LCA is 
conveniently specified by a decimal integer ω representing the 
rule number by:  
                         𝜔 = ∑ 𝜆𝑗2
𝑟+𝑗𝑟
𝑗=−𝑟                              (4)            
In the same way like RCAs, the state of every LMCA's cell 
at time t+1 depends on the states of its neighbor cells at 
different time steps t, t-1, t-2, …,t-m. Particularly, using linear 
transition rules defined by equation (4), one can define m-
order LMCA whose local transition function takes the 
following form:  






) + ⋯+ 𝑓𝜔𝑚(𝑉𝑖
(𝑡−𝑚+1)
)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 2)    (5) 
where 0≤ i ≤n-1, and 1, 2,....., m {0,1,...,22r+1-1}. In this 
case, in order to start the evolution of the LMCA, m initial 
configurations are required. The following proposition 
describes how to construct a reversible LMCA. 
Proposition II.1. If 𝑓𝜔𝑚(𝑉𝑖
(𝑡−𝑚+1)
) = 𝑠𝑖
(𝑡−𝑚+1), then the LMCA 
expressed by: 








(𝑚𝑜𝑑 2)        (6) 
is reversible and its reverse is another LMCA with the 
following local transition function: 




, … , 𝑉𝑖
(𝑡−𝑚+1)
) (𝑚𝑜𝑑 2)                               
    = 𝑓𝜔𝑚−1 (𝑉𝑖
(𝑡)
) + ⋯+ 𝑓𝜔1 (𝑉𝑖
(𝑡−𝑚+2)
) + 𝑠𝑖
(𝑡−𝑚+1)(𝑚𝑜𝑑 2)     (7) 
where 0≤ i ≤n-1, and 1, 2,....., m {0,1,...,22r+1-1}. Proof of 
this proposition can be found in Fredkin [12]. 
C. Secret sharing using LMCAs  
Using linear memory cellular automata, a secret sharing 
scheme has been proposed initially by [5]. As the scheme is a 
(t,n)-threshold one, the secret is considered as an initial 
configuration of a t-order LMCA, while remaining (t-1) 
configurations are randomly generated. By evolving the 
constructed LMCA, n consecutive configurations are created 
to define the n different shares distributed among the n 
participants. When secret's reconstruction is desired, the 
LMCA is running backward starting from any set of t 
consecutive shares, permitting a perfect reconstruction of the 
initially shared secret in a linear time with respect to the size 
of secret.  
Suppose that the secret is defined by the initial 
configuration C0. Remaining t-1 configurations C1,C2,...Ct-1 
that are necessary to run the designed t-order LMCA are 
generated randomly (if the scheme share a  unique secret) or 
are defined by the remaining secrets (if the scheme handle 
multiple secret). The set {C0,C1,.....,Ct-1} is then used to build 
an (n+t-1)-th order evolution of the LMCA to obtain a set of n 
consecutive configuration  {Ct,Ct+1,.....,Cn+t-1} distributed 
among the n participants. When required, any set of t 
consecutive configurations {Ct+,Ct++1,.....,C2t+-1} is used to 
define a set {?̃?(0), ?̃?(1), … , ?̃?(𝑡−1)} as the initial configuration 
to run the inverse LMCA backward for +t  iterations and 
recover the secret [5]. The set of t-1 transition rules used for 
the LMCA evolution 1, 2,....., t-1 is generated initially by 
the dealer and made public without affecting the security of 
the scheme. 
Even if the LMCA's based secret sharing provides linear 
time complexity sharing and reconstruction with respect to 
existing schemes, it  does not define a robust (t,n)-threshold 
mechanism since not all subsets of t participants can recover 
the secret, but only those having consecutive shares 
(configurations) (as explained in the introduction section). 
Several enhancements have been proposed later in [6,7,8] and 
[9], but they all targeted the enhancements of other sharing 
aspects such as multi-secrets support, share's verifiability, t-
consistence and  traceability. The main robustness's drawback 
of LMCA's based sharing scheme has not been addressed yet. 
In the present work, we present for the first time a solution 
to the robustness problem of LMCAs based sharing schemes. 
The basic idea is simple: instead of defining the share of each 
participant by only one configuration, a subset of 
configuration is attributed to each participant such that the 
union set of t subsets from t different participants contain a 
unique sequence of t consecutive configurations, while the 
union of any less number of subsets do not permit to obtain 
such sequence. Details and proofs of the proposed scheme are 
presented in the following sections. 
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
In this section, we present a new secret sharing scheme 
based on one dimensional LMCA. The proposed (t,n)-
threshold scheme (2<t<n-1) is robust, such that any subset of 
at less t participant can fully recover the shared secret when 
pooling their shares together. As usual, three main phases are 
necessary for the secret sharing scheme: (1) the setup phase, 
during which the dealer generates parameters of the scheme 
and defines the t-order LMCA; (2) the sharing phase, when the 
dealer creates the n different shares using the defined LMCA 
and the secret' data, and finally (3) the reconstruction phase 
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permitting to recover the secret from any  set of t different 
shares. Note that in the proposed work, we used LMCA have a 
radius r=3, so the transition rules belong to the set {0,...,127}.  
 
A. Construction of the assignment matrix 
As mentioned above, the dealer need an assignment matrix 
in order to distributed the LMCA's configuration among the n 
participants. The assignment matrix is used to decide which 
set of  configurations should be given to each user, such that 
each one obtains configurations having as indexes the 
elements of  the participant's corresponding column.  
The assignment matrix noted A has n column 
(corresponding to n participant) and 𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2 rows of integer 
elements. It is built in a way that satisfy the following 
conditions: 
(1) Combining t-1 columns does not permits to construct a 
sequence of t consecutive numbers; 
(2) Combining any t columns permits to construct a sequence 
of t consecutive numbers;  
Theoretically, building such matrix is a combinatorial hard 
problem. Hence, we have heuristically developed an algorithm 
that permits such construction and produces a matrix 
respecting the two conditions mentioned above. In addition, no 
restriction is imposed on the upper limit of the matrix's 
elements, and duplicated values are allowed. Each column i of 
the matrix correspond to a participant Pi for 1≤ i ≤ n.  The 
assignment matrix A is constructed according to the following 
steps : 
1. Initially , the matrix A having n columns and 𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2  rows 
is initialized  with zeros; let CS be the set of all possible 
𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2 combinations of (t-2)-uplet of indexes from the set 
{2,...,n-1} that is previously constructed, and let's suppose 
that an integer value id defines the smallest value 
permitted for matrix’s elements (can trivially be equal to 
1). The matrix is constructed row by row starting by the 
first one. 
2. The first elements of the row receives the value of id; then 
the first combination from CS is picked; 
3. Elements of the currently picked combination are used as 
indexes to fill up the current row of A: if the combination 
is defined by <i1,i2,…,it-2>  then we assign the value id+k 
to the each element A[ik]; 
4. Each one of the matrix’s elements at the current row 
having index higher than it-2 (the higher index value of the 
combination) receives the value id+t-1; 
5. A last verification step consists in looking over the 
elements of the current row from 2 to n-1 and testing: if 
the element is still equal to 0, then the element receives 
the value of the prior one; 
6. If all the 𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2  rows have been filled, then the algorithm 
ends. Otherwise, it increments the index of the current 
row, updates the value of id by id:=id+t+1 and returns to 
step 2. 
A  pseudo-algorithmic description of the matrix generation 
procedure is given in the following. We consider CS[0.. 𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2-
1] to be an array representing all possible t-2 combinations on 
the values {2,...,n-1} such that each element CS[k] is a 
possible combination <i1k,i2k,…,it-2k>. 
Input : t,n :integers; CS ; id :integer (value of the smallest permitted 
element of the matrix);  
Output :The assignments matrix A having n columns and 𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2 rows; 
For i:=1 to  𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2  do 
     For j:=1 to n do {A[i,j]:=0;} 
For i:=1 to  𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2  do {A[i,1]:=id; 
      For k:=1 to t-2 do {A[i,CS[i][k]]:=id+k;} 
      For k:= CS[i][t-2]+1  to n do {A[i][k]:=id+t-1;} 
For k:=2 to n-1 do {if A[i][k]=0   then A[i][k]:=A[i][k-1];} 
         id:=id+t+1;   }; 
 
The proposed algorithm is designed to ensure the two 
conditions mentioned above. Incrementing the id value with a 
supplementary value 1 is performed from row to row in order 
to avoid that two consecutive rows contain a sequence of t 
consecutive elements by introducing a sequence gap. Let’s 
illustrate in the following an example of the matrix 
construction using values n=6 and t=4: 
Firstly, using the parameters values, it is clear that the 
matrix has 6 columns and 𝐶4
2 = 6 rows. The set CS of 𝐶4
2 
possible index’s combination form the set {2,3,4,5} is equal to 
{(2,3),(2,4),(2,5),(3,4),(3,5),(4,5)}. By applying the proposed 
algorithm, the following matrix is obtained : 







1 2 3 4 4 4
6 7 7 8 9 9
11 12 12 12 13 14
16 16 17 18 19 19
21 21 22 22 23 24






                     (8) 
We can easily verify that combining any 4 columns of the 
matrix permits to obtain a sequence of four consecutive 
numbers. For example combining the columns 1,2,3 and 4 
gives the sequence of consecutive values {1,2,3,4}, while 
combining the columns 2,3,5 and 6 gives the sequence of 
consecutive values {21,22,23,24}. In contrast, combining any 
three columns do not permits to get any sequence of four 
consecutive numbers. 
Another example can be illustrated for n=5 and t=3. Here, the 
set CS is simply the set of possible values from {2,3,4} having 
length one, that is trivially equal to the same set {2,3,4}. 
Applying the algorithm gives the following assignment matrix 
having three rows and five columns: 
                                 A = [
1 2 3 3 3
5 5 6 7 7
9 9 9 10 11
]                                (9) 
The same properties exist in this matrix when grouping 
element of any three columns leads always to a sequence of 
three consecutive numbers.   
Let’s show in the following that for any values of the 
parameters n and t, the produced assignment matrix always 
verify conditions (1) and (2): 
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Lemma III.1. For any values of n and t, the assignment matrix 
constructed using the proposed algorithm has the following 
properties : 
1. The union set of elements for any t  columns contains 
always a sequence of t consecutive numbers; 
2. The union set of any t-1 or less columns do not contain 
any sequence of t consecutive numbers. 
Proof. 
We start by proofing the first assumption. Suppose having a 
combination B=<i1,i2,….,it> of t different columns from the 
matrix A (ikij 1k,jt). We also suppose that the 
combination’s elements are sorted in ascending order 
(i1<i2<….<it ).  
Let’s consider  B’=<i2,i3,….,it-1> the sub combination of B 
restricted on the t-2 elements by deleting the first and the last 
one, and let Ord(B’) be the order of B’ within the set CS.  
It is clear from the algorithm that since B’CS, t-2 following 
consecutive numbers: 
    {id+Ord(B’)*t+1, id+Ord(B’)*t+2, id+Ord(B’)*t+3,……,  
 id+Ord(B’)*t+t-2 }                            (10) 
will be affected to the indexes of B’ during the first loop of 
iteration number Ord(B’) (the iteration using B’ as 
combination base). In addition, the second loop will assign the 
value id+Ord(B’)*t+t-1 to remaining indexes higher than it-1, 
and since it>it-1, the value of the current row at the index it  will 
receive the value id+Ord(B’)*t+t-1. As a result we get t-1 
consecutive values {id+Ord(B’)*t+1, id+Ord(B’)*t+2, 
id+Ord(B’)*t+3,……, id+Ord(B’)*t+t-2 , id+Ord(B’)*t+t-1} 
for the indexes <i2,i2,….,it>. 
Now we consider the first index i1. In the same row 
(corresponding to iteration number Ord(B’)), unless i1 is equal 
to one (i1=1) and in this case the value of the row at position i1 
is certainly equal to id+Ord(B’)*t (since it is the initialization 
value of each row). Otherwise, if i1>1, and since by 
assumption i1<i2, no value will be assigned to the value of the 
current row at position i1 during the second loop (its value 
remain equal 0). During the third loop, this value will take the 
one of prior position than is certainly equal to the value of the 
first column in the current row id+Ord(B’)*t. As a 
consequence, in all cases, a sequence {id+Ord(B’)*t, 
id+Ord(B’)*t+1, id+Ord(B’)*t+2,……, id+Ord(B’)*t+t-1} can 
be constructed for the combination B and it is clearly a 
sequence of t consecutive numbers. 
Proofing the second assumption is easier : suppose we have 
a combination of t-1 columns < i1,i2,….,it-1> from A. It is clear 
that since a gap is introduced between each two consecutive 
rows (i.e. the value of the first element of the new row is 
always incremented with one according to the last value of the 
prior row), sequence of t consecutive numbers can only be 
obtained on a single row. Now since we have only t-1 different 
indexes for the t-1 columns, we can never collect a sequence 
of t numbers from the same row. Hence no t consecutive 
sequence of t numbers can be collected. 
Based on the assignment matrix constructed using the 
proposed algorithm for any two values t and n verifying 
2<t<n-1, we propose an LMCA-based secret sharing scheme 
in the next section. A subset of configurations is assigned to 
each participant using the indexes of his corresponding 
column of the matrix. Note that the algorithm returns a new 
value of the parameter id that represents the highest value of 
the matrix’s elements, and determines the number of LMCA’s 
configurations to be constructed. 
B. The setup phase 
During the setup phase, the dealer responsible for the shares 
generation should firstly define the parameters of the scheme. 
The following steps are performed during this phase: 
1. The dealer generates t-1 random integer from the set 
{0,...,127} in order to define the t-1 transition rules 1, 
2,....., t-1 defining the t-1 local transition functions f1, 
f2,....., ft-1. 
2. The dealer divides the secret S on |S| byte into t parts 
PS1,PS2,...,PSt having sizes equal to [|S|/t], each part 
defines a configuration of LMCA as follows: 
           C0 = PS1, C
1 = PS2, … , C
t−1 = PSt           (11)   
If the value of |S| does not divide t, a padding scheme is 
used to complete cells in Ct-1.   
3. The dealer generates a public random integer number 
>n+1. This parameter is used to introduce a sufficient 
diffusion and confusion between the LMCA 
configurations and hence produces more randomness in 
the resulting shares.    
4. The dealer constructs an assignment matrix A using the 
parameters t, n and id=. The returned value of id (the 
highest element of the matrix) is assigned to a new 
parameter  used in the following steps. It is clear that  
is the smallest element of the matrix A, while  is the 
highest one. 
5. The dealer computes the evolution of ()-th order of the 
LMCA, starting from the initial configurations 
{C0,C1,.....,Ct-1}: 
           {C0, C1, … , Ct−1, Ct, … , Cn, … , Cα, … Cβ−1, Cβ}      (12) 
C. The sharing phase 
During the sharing phase, the dealer uses the -+1 
{C,C+1,....,C} last configurations generated during the setup 
phase to build the shares distributed among the n participants 
P1,P2, ...,Pn like the following:  
1. For each participant Pi, the dealer assigns a subset Sbi of 
configurations from the set {C,C+1,....,C}      having as 
indexes the values of the ith column  from the assignments 
matrix A: 
Sbi = {C
A[1,i], CA[2,i], … . . , CA[Cn−2
t−2 −1,i], CA[Cn−2
t−2 ,i]  }  (13) 
Each participant will receive exactly 𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2 different 
configurations.   
2. For each participants Pi, the configurations of its 
corresponding set Sbi are concatenated to form the 
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corresponding share. The shares are finally distributed 
among the participants among a secure channel.  
Note that the number of all distributed configurations 
among all participants is equal to the number of elements of 
the matrix (equal to n* 𝐶𝑛−2
𝑡−2 ) that is lower than the number of 
total generated configurations equal to -+1. This difference 
is due to two factors: the gaps introduced between consecutive 
rows during matrix creation, and the repetition procedure 
introduced to satisfy combinations belonging to the same row. 
D. The reconstruction phase 
During the construction phase, the combiner reconstructs 
the secret from at least t different shares from t distinct 
participants {Pi1,Pi2,....,Pit} according to the following steps : 
1. For each participant Pik, the corresponding share is 
transformed into a set of configurations according to the 
values that correspond to elements of the (ik)th column of 
A. The share of participant Pik defines the following set of 
Cn−2
t−2  configurations: 
                      Sik = {C
A[1,ik], CA[2,ik], … . . , CA[Cn−2
t−2 ,ik]}          (14)       
2. The combiner constructs the union set SU of all the t 
participant’s subsets of configurations like the following :  
                                  SU = ⋃ Sii=i1….it                           (15) 
3. According to the Lemma III.1, there exists always a 
sequence of t consecutive numbers in each union of t 
different columns from the assignment matrix A. The 
combiner determines the set of consecutive indexes from 
the matrix noted Seq={v1,v2,...,vt}. Using Seq, The 
combiner construct the following sequence :  
                     {Cv1 , Cv2 , … . . , Cvt}            (16) 
that is a set of consecutive configurations in the set SU.  
4. Since the set Seq is ordered, v1 is the smallest integer of 
the sequence, the combiner than computes the (v1)-th 
order evolution of the inverse LMCA constructed during 
the sharing step (using the same transition rules i's). The 
inverse LMCA is run using the following configurations: 
          {Č0 =  Cvt , Č1 = Cvt−1 , … . . , Čt−1 = Cv1}         (17)     
and the inverse LMCA is run for v1 iteration to obtain  the t 
configurations representing the initially shared secret.    
According to the proposition II.1, the initial configurations 
can always be recovered. Hence the secret can be 
reconstructed by concatenating recovered configurations to 
build the initially shared secret. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
We show in the following that the proposed scheme verify 
robustness and secrecy. Robustness of the scheme means that 
only a set of at less t participants can recover the shared secret, 
while t-1 or less number of them cannot reveal any 
information about it. Secrecy of the scheme means that 
individual shares indistinguishable from randomly generated 
data. Robustness is shown in the following using theoretic 
assumptions, while secrecy of the scheme is experimentally 
demonstrated using randomness's  measurements of produced 
shares.  
A. Robustness of the scheme 
Robustness of the proposed scheme relays on the following 
facts :  
a) A t-order LMCA's mechanism can reconstruct initial t 
configurations from any subset of t consecutive ones 
using the corresponding inverse LMCA with defined 
linear transitions rules; 
b) Reconstruction of initial t configurations of an LMCA is 
impossible when using any t-1 or less number of 
configurations; 
c) The assignment matrix constructed using the proposed 
corresponding algorithm ensures that union of the 
elements of any t columns permits to build a sequence of t 
consecutive values, while the union of any t-1 or less 
columns does not permits it. 
The first fact is established by the proof of the proposition 
II.1 form section 2. Is has been shown in [12] that LMCA 
constructed according to equations (6) and (7) are always 
reversible, while their inversion using t-1 or less 
configurations is a computationally hard problem. Hence the 
facts (a) and (b) are proofed. 
The fact (c) can be shown using Lemma III.1 from section 
3. We have established that the proposed matrix construction 
algorithm produces always valid matrices. Their validity is 
considered with respect to the two constraints of the lemma, 
that correspond exactly to the requirement of the fact (c). By 
combining the verifiability of the three facts (a),(b) and (c), we 
conclude that the proposed scheme is robust. 
B. Illustrative experiments and secrecy analysis 
In order to illustrate the steps of the proposed scheme and to 
experimentally show the secrecy of the produced shares, we 
develop in the following an illustrative example of secret 
sharing using the proposed approach. We choose to apply the 
scheme to share the digital (512x512) color image illustrated 
in figure 1. Digital images sharing is one of the most active 
research area related to secret sharing due to their specific 
characteristics such as redundancy, bulky data capacity and 
high correlation across blocks of pixels. 
Let’s build a (3,7)-threshold secret sharing scheme (i.e t=3 
and n=7). We firstly define the parameters of the scheme by 
generating the transition rules. Two values 1 and 2 are 
chosen from {0,…,127}: let’s assume 1=45 and 2=138. We 
also assign a random value to the parameter  (to ensure a 
sufficient diffusion and randomization of the shares), so let’s 
choose  =25. 
The assignment matrix A having 7 columns and 𝐶7−2
3−2 =
𝐶5
1 = 5 rows is generated using the proposed algorithm: the 
set CS of t-2=1 possible combinations on the set {2,3,4,5,6} is 
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trivially CS={2,3,4,5,6} (since the length of combinations is 
equal to one). We consequently obtain the following matrix:                                                                             
                   







25 26 27 27 27 27 27
29 29 30 31 31 31 31
33 33 33 34 35 35 35
37 37 37 37 38 39 39





               (18) 
when each column correspond to a given participant. As 
output of the algorithm, we obtain the value of the parameter 
=43 (the highest value of the matrix’s elements).  
The secret image is then decomposed into three blocks 
defining the three configurations of the LMCA C0,C1 and C2. 
Since the image contain 512x512=262144 pixel each one on 3 
bytes (the image is a 24bit color one), the size of each 
configuration is 262144*3/3=262144 byte. We finally 
construct the 3-order LMCA and evolve it using the 
configurations C0,C1 and C2 for   = 42 iteration using the rules 
1 and 2 . We finally obtain a set of 42 consecutive 
configurations {C0,C1,….,C42}.  
Using the assignment matrix A, obtained configurations are 
assigned according to equation (13) in order to construct the 
different participant’s shares Si (1i7) like the following : 
 
S1 = {C
25 , C29, C33 , C37 , C41} 
S2 = {C
26, C29, C33, C37 , C41} 
S3 = {C
27 , C30, C33, C37, C41} 
                  S4 = {C
27, C31, C34, C37 , C41}                      (19) 
S5 = {C
27 , C31, C35, C38, C41} 
S6 = {C
27, C31 , C35 , C39, C42} 
S7 = {C
27, C31 , C35 , C39, C43} 
For each participant, the configurations are assembled and 
concatenated to form the final share. Since each configuration 
is on 262144 byte, the size of the share is equal to 
262144*5=1310720 byte, and can then be represented as a 
color image of 661x661 pixels (using a padding scheme to 
complete remaining 14 pixels). Figure 2 illustrates the 
obtained seven shares when sharing the image of figure 1 
using the proposed approach with respect to a (3,7)-threshold 
sharing scheme. 
It is clear from figure 2 that obtained shares have random 
aspect and hence do not reveal any useful information about 
the originally shared secret. In order to approve this fact, 
several statistical experiments have been performed on the 
shares in order to show that they are indistinguishable from 
random noise. The shares have been analyzed using both 
 
(a)                                           (b)   
 
                     (c)                                            (d)                  
 
                     (e)                                         (f)        
                         
                    (g) 
Fig 2. Obtained shares (661x661) for the secret image of figure 
(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f) and (g) are respectively the shares of 
P1,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6 and P7. 
 
Fig. 1.  The secret image (512x512) used to illustrate the proposed 
scheme. 
  
100 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS SOFTWARE AND SYSTEMS, VOL. 11, NO. 2, JUNE 2015
 
Diehard and ENT statistical Tests batteries [13], when 
obtained results are averaged and reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
We can easily note from the results that the shares content has 
very good statistical properties since it pass majority of 
applied tests. Such results imply that the shares are 
indistinguishable from random images, and as a result, the 
sharing scheme ensures secrecy. 
Now suppose that a given subset of participants colludes to 
recover the secret image. Since the scheme is (3,7)-threshold 
one, at least the shares of three different participant are 
required. Let’s suppose that P2,P4 and P7 are those participants, 
so the combiner uses the shares illustrated by figures 2.(b), 
2.(d) and 2.(g). Each share is decomposed into its composing 
configurations, to get the three configuration’s sets  S2,S4 and 
S7 defined in equation (19). The combiner then uses the public 
assignment matrix and construct the union set SU=S2S4S7. 
It is clear that after ordering, the set SU is defined by: 
 
   SU = {C
26, C27, C29, C31, 𝐂𝟑𝟑 , 𝐂𝟑𝟒, 𝐂𝟑𝟓, C37, C39, C41, C43}   (20) 
The set SU contains the sequence of three consecutive 
configurations C33,C34 and C35. According to the 
reconstruction scheme, and since 33 is the smallest 
configuration’s index, the combiner run the inverse LMCA 
(using the same public transition rules 1 and 2) for 33 
iteration starting from the initial configurations C35,C34 and 
C33 (in inverse order) to reconstruct the configurations C2,C1 
and C0 that define the initially shared secret image. When 
applied on the shares of figures 2.(b), 2.(d) and 2.(g), the 
reconstruction scheme recover exactly the same image of 
figure 1 since the proposed approach is lossless.  
C. Share's size and efficacy analysis 
Since the proposed scheme assigns multiple configurations 
to the same participant, the size of the share is always higher 
than the size of the secret. According to the sharing scheme, if 
we consider that the size of the secret is given by |S|, the 
threshold and the number of participants are t and n 
respectively, then the estimated size of each share is given by : 




                               (21) 
 
 Depending of the threshold and the participants number, 
the size of the share may differ and be extremely high for 
some combinations of t and n. We have experimentally studied 
the evolution of the share’s size with respect to the parameters 
of the scheme in order to define its efficiency conditions. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the scaling factor between the 
secret’s size and the share’s size with respect to t and n. It is 
clear that the scheme is effective in a sufficiently large region 
of the space and becomes impractical in the mentioned region. 
According to these results, we conclude that using the 
proposed scheme is conditioned by the relation between the 
values of t and n, and even if the scheme ensures a full 
robustness, it is largely non-ideal when t is in the 
neighborhood of n/2. So in general, LMCS-based sharing 
scheme can ensures either a full robustness without ideality or 
ensures ideality without robustness like provided with existing 
LMCA-based schemes.   
For further illustrations of the proposed scheme properties 
and capabilities, a comparative study is given in table 3. The 
scheme is compared to some recent existing threshold sharing 
schemes with respect to several performances parameters. It is 
clear that with respect to CA-based schemes, the proposed one 
is the only that ensures robustness, while ideality is only 
ensured if t and n do not belongs to the impractical region. 
Linear computational complexity is another advantage of the 
scheme that is not ensured by almost all non-LMCA schemes 
having at least a polynomial complexity. 
TABLE I 
AVERAGED RESULTS OF THE DIEHARD TESTS BATTERY APPLIED ON 
THE PRODUCED SHARES 
Test Name Averaged P-value 
Interpret-
ation 
BIRTHDAY SPACINGS  
OVERLAPPING PERMUTATION   
RANK TEST 31x31   
RANK TEST 32x32   
MONKEY DNA   
COUNT-THE-1's TEST   
PARKING LOT   
MINIMUM DISTANCE   
RUNDOM SPHERE   
The SQEEZE test   
OVERLAPPING SUMS   
The RUNS -up test, down test-   
CRAPS -no of wins ,thrwos/game-    
RANK TEST  
MONKEY 20 BITS PER WORD   












0 .920325 0.531017 






















AVERAGED RESULTS OF THE ENT TESTS BATTERY APPLIED ON THE 
PRODUCED SHARES 
Test Value Norm 
Entropy   
Arithmetic mean  
Monte Carlo    
Serial correlation coefficient 














Fig. 3.  Estimated scaling factor between the secret’s size and the 
share’s size with respect to possible values of t and n. 
  




V. CONCLUSIONS  
The present paper aims to solve the robustness problem of 
cellular automata based threshold secret sharing schemes. 
While all existing CA-based schemes provide linear 
computational complexity for sharing and reconstructing 
secrets, they all fail to ensure a robust sharing mechanism 
since only the shares defined by consecutive shares can be 
used to recover the secret. Hence, a very large number of 
authorized participant’s subsets are unable to reconstruct the 
initially shared data. To solve the problem, we proposed to 
assign multiple configurations to each user in order to permit 
to each subset of at least t participants to get an access to the 
full secret reconstruction. A specific assignment matrix is 
heuristically generated using a proposed algorithm, and used 
to define a new sharing/reconstruction mechanisms. The 
proposed scheme has been shown to be robust, and has 
undergo several experimental benchmarking to illustrate the 
secrecy of its produced shares. Security of the proposed 
scheme is established, and conditions of its ideality are 
illustrated with respect to the values of the parameters t and n.  
With respect to exiting non-CA secret sharing schemes, the 
proposed one ensures a linear sharing/reconstruction 
complexities that leads to faster and scalable performances, 
while it provides a full robustness property compared to 
exiting CA-based schemes. However, an expensive cost of 
large shares size with respect to the secret size can arias for 
some values of t and n, inducing a non-ideality of the scheme.  
We conclude according to our studies that cellular 
automaton cannot provide an ideal solution to the sharing 
problem without losing robustness, and we are working as 
future works on optimization of the assignment matrix to find 
a solution with less row’s number that can further optimize the 
size of the produced shares.  
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